University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Health Care Management Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

2013

Has the Shift to Managed Care Reduced Medicaid Expenditures?
Evidence From State and Local-Level Mandates
Mark Duggan
University of Pennsylvania

Tamara Hayford

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers

Recommended Citation
Duggan, M., & Hayford, T. (2013). Has the Shift to Managed Care Reduced Medicaid Expenditures?
Evidence From State and Local-Level Mandates. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 32 (3),
505-535. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/pam.21693

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers/88
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Has the Shift to Managed Care Reduced Medicaid Expenditures? Evidence From
State and Local-Level Mandates
Abstract
From 1991 to 2009, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in HMOs and other forms of Medicaid
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state Medicaid expenditures. The findings suggest that shifting Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service
into MMC did not on average reduce Medicaid spending. If anything, our results suggest that the shift to
MMC increased Medicaid spending and that this effect was especially present for risk-based HMOs.
However, the effects of the shift to MMC on Medicaid spending varied significantly across states as a
function of the generosity of the state’s baseline Medicaid provider reimbursement rates.
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Abstract
From 1991 to 2009, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in HMOs and other forms of
Medicaid managed care (MMC) increased from 11 percent to 71 percent. This increase was largely
driven by state and local mandates that required most Medicaid recipients to enroll in an MMC plan.
Theoretically, it is ambiguous whether the shift from fee-for-service into managed care would lead to
an increase or a reduction in Medicaid spending. This paper investigates this effect using a data set
on state and local level MMC mandates and detailed data from CMS on state Medicaid expenditures.
The findings suggest that shifting Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service into MMC did not reduce
Medicaid spending in the typical state. If anything, our results suggest that the shift to MMC
increased Medicaid spending and that this effect was especially present for risk-based HMOs.
However, the effects of the shift to MMC on Medicaid spending varied significantly across states as
a function of the generosity of the state’s baseline Medicaid provider reimbursement rates.
JEL Classification: H51, H72, I11, I18, L33
Keywords: Medicaid, managed care, HMO, fee-for-service

1

1. Introduction
The Medicaid program currently provides health insurance to more than 60 million lowincome U.S. residents. Expenditures are jointly financed by the federal and state governments, and
total program expenditures were $401 billion in 2010 (CMS, 2010). Each state administers its own
Medicaid program and has some latitude with respect to eligibility rules, which services are covered,
and how generously to reimburse health care providers. States also have flexibility in how they
administer the benefit, with many opting to contract with health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
and other managed care organizations (MCOs) to coordinate and finance care for Medicaid
recipients.
The usual motivations for Medicaid managed care (MMC) contracting are to improve quality
and reduce expenditures relative to the traditional fee-for-service model. The most common type of
MMC plan is the HMO, which receives a fixed amount per Medicaid recipient per month to
coordinate and finance all enrollee’s medical care.1 Contracting with HMOs includes the additional
benefit of partially insulating the state from financial risk and thus improving budgetary
predictability. The other common MMC model is primary care case management (PCCM), in which
a primary care provider both monitors and approves the care received by Medicaid recipients while
receiving a small management fee each month (in addition to any fee-for-service reimbursement to
which they are entitled).2 By 2009, more than 71 percent of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in
some form of managed care (KFF, 2010a). The corresponding share in the early 1990s was just 10
percent. The increases in MMC enrollment during this period were largely driven by state and local
mandates that required certain categories of Medicaid recipients to enroll in a managed care plan.
In this paper, we use data for all fifty states and the District of Columbia to investigate the
effect of MMC contracting on Medicaid expenditures.
1

Theoretically, one might expect MMC

In some instances specific services, such as nursing home care, may be carved out of the MMC contract.
Some states also contract with prepaid health plans, which typically only cover limited services, such as mental
health, substance abuse, and non-emergency transportation.
2
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contracting to reduce program expenditures, as HMOs would have a strong financial incentive to
reduce the use of unnecessary treatments, to improve the coordination of medical care, and to keep
patients healthy. Even PCCM plans could lower spending if they improved medication adherence or
steered enrollees to more efficient providers. On the other hand, previous work has found that the key
channel through which managed care reduces spending in the private health insurance market is by
negotiating lower provider prices (Cutler et al, 2000; Dor et al, 2004; Shen and Melnick, 2006).
Medicaid’s provider reimbursement rates are generally much lower than those for commercial
insurers, leaving little room to reduce expenditures through the price channel. Thus, even if insurers
succeed in reducing the utilization of medical care, spending might increase if insurers cannot
negotiate provider payment rates that are as low as the fee-for-service Medicaid program.
Previous work on the effect of MMC on Medicaid expenditures has focused on individual
states, in most cases over relatively short time periods, rather than considering all states
simultaneously. The results from this research provide mixed evidence, with some studies suggesting
that MMC enrollment increases Medicaid spending and others finding the opposite. Of course, the
results from any one state may not generalize to the nation as a whole, as each state’s Medicaid
program has unique features that might influence its benefits from MMC contracting. Thus it is
ultimately an empirical question whether the shift of Medicaid recipients from traditional fee-forservice into managed care plans has on average reduced the strain on state budgets and also whether
this effect varies across states.
To investigate this issue, we obtained data for the 1991 through 2009 time period on
Medicaid enrollment, MMC enrollment, and state Medicaid spending from the U.S. Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). This data is available annually at the state level and
includes detailed information about the type of spending (e.g. hospital, physician, managed care plan)
and about the type of MMC enrollment (HMO or PCCM). During the time period that we consider,
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the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC plans increased from 11 percent to 71 percent,
as shown in Table 1.
Our first set of empirical analyses investigates the relationship between the fraction of a
state’s Medicaid recipients in managed care plans and its Medicaid spending. Our specifications
control for Medicaid enrollment and the demographic characteristics of Medicaid recipients. We also
include state fixed effects to account for unobserved, time-invariant differences across states, year
fixed effects to control for changes in Medicaid spending that are common to all states in a given
year, and state-specific time trends to account for differences across states in the growth rate of
Medicaid spending that are unrelated to MMC enrollment.
Our findings indicate that increases in MMC enrollment are significantly positively related
with total Medicaid spending. More specifically, a 10 percentage point increase in MMC enrollment
is associated with a 0.6 percent increase in Medicaid spending. This estimate is driven by the shift to
Medicaid HMOs and other risk-based plans, as PCCM enrollment growth is not significantly related
with Medicaid spending. Our estimates increase when we exclude those categories of Medicaid
spending that would be largely unaffected by MMC. More specifically, when we exclude Medicaid
DSH and long-term care spending, our estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in MMC
enrollment increases Medicaid spending by 1.0 percent.
One possible concern with this first set of results is that Medicaid recipients who enroll in
MMC may differ in unobserved ways from those who remain in traditional fee-for-service. For
example, Medicaid recipients who ―opt in‖ to MMC may have higher or lower costs on average than
their observably similar counterparts in fee-for-service. To address this concern, we next pursue an
instrumental variables (IV) strategy in which we utilize data from the Urban Institute regarding state
and local mandates that required Medicaid recipients to enroll in an HMO or some other form of
managed care. This data set allows us to identify which counties in the U.S. had a Medicaid HMO
and/or PCCM mandate in effect for each year from 1991 to 2001, and we update this data through
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2003.3 We create our instrument by using county population to construct the share of a state’s
residents in a county with an MMC mandate in each year.
Our analyses exploit cross-state variation in the timing and the extent of the MMC mandates.
As shown in Figure 1, some states require Medicaid recipients to enroll in MMC early in our period,
whereas others implement their MMC mandates much later. Similarly, while essentially all counties
are covered by MMC mandates in some states, only a portion is directly affected in others. Using
this MMC mandate data, we first demonstrate that our instrument is significantly positively related
with MMC enrollment. More specifically, for every 10 Medicaid recipients ―exposed‖ to an MMC
mandate, there is an increase of approximately 4 in the number of MMC enrollees. The relationship
is not one-for-one because some Medicaid recipients are already voluntarily enrolled and others are
exempt from the mandates.4
As an additional check on our instrument, we also confirm that MMC mandates induce a
significant reduction in Medicaid spending paid directly to hospitals and other health care providers
and a corresponding increase in payments to Medicaid HMOs and other managed care organizations.
This effect is entirely driven by HMO mandates, as these organizations finance most of the care
themselves, rather than by PCCM mandates.
Using this MMC mandate variable as an instrument for a state’s MMC enrollment, we next
estimate the average effect of MMC enrollment on total Medicaid spending. Our key identifying
assumption is that the timing of the mandates is orthogonal to other unobserved determinants of
Medicaid spending. To the extent that states shift their Medicaid recipients into managed care plans
after sharp changes (relative to trend) in Medicaid spending, this assumption could be violated
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We were unable to reliably update this information beyond 2003.
Medicaid enrollees may receive exemptions from MMC mandates for reasons such as language or geographic
barriers to seeing an in-network provider or having an established relationship with a non-network physician for
pregnancy or complex medical needs.
4
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through regression-to-the-mean or other channels. We therefore test this assumption in a number of
ways and our results generally support the validity of this assumption.
Our IV estimates for the effect of MMC on Medicaid spending are smaller in magnitude than
our OLS estimates and are not statistically significant. However, the findings are broadly consistent
with our OLS results in that they provide little evidence to suggest MMC lowered Medicaid
spending. Additionally and consistent with our OLS results, our IV estimates suggest Medicaid
HMOs increase Medicaid spending by more than did PCCM plans.
We conclude by exploring whether the effect varies with the generosity of a state’s Medicaid
provider reimbursement. Our results indicate that, in states where Medicaid provider reimbursement
is very low (high) relative to commercial reimbursement, MMC contracting increases (decreases)
Medicaid spending. Given that the effect is present for both HMO and PCCM plans, this
heterogeneity could result from two distinct channels. First, if Medicaid provider rates are already
much lower than commercial insurers pay, it may be difficult for an HMO to lower spending even if
it reduces utilization. Second, if Medicaid provider rates are quite high, there may be a significant
amount of overutilization that either an HMO or a PCCM could reduce. Both of these mechanisms
may be contributing to the heterogeneity that we document, and our results suggest that Medicaid
managed care is most likely to reduce spending in those states with more generous reimbursement.
Our findings regarding the effect of MMC on Medicaid spending take on additional
significance when one considers that many states are currently expanding MMC to more Medicaid
recipients. For example, recent survey evidence indicates that at least twenty states are planning to
expand the reach of their MMC programs in the near future (KFF, 2010c). Additionally, Medicaid
enrollment is projected to increase substantially during the next several years as a result of the
recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).
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In the pages that follow, we describe the growth in MMC during the past two decades, briefly
summarize the literature on MMC, describe our data and identification strategy, and use multiple
approaches to estimate the effect of MMC enrollment on Medicaid spending.

2. The Growth in MMC Enrollment from 1991 to 2009
In 1991 and as shown in Table 1, just 10.6 percent of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in a
managed care plan. Most (7.4 percentage points) of this enrollment was in HMOs and other prepaid
health plans. These plans are typically paid a fixed amount per member per month, and are
responsible for choosing a network of health care providers, negotiating reimbursement rates, and
managing the care of their enrollees. The key feature of the HMO payment model is that the plan is
at risk for the cost of their enrollees’ medical care. If enrollees’ costs turn out to be higher than
anticipated, the MMC plan does not receive additional reimbursement. Because of this, HMOs and
other prepaid health plans have a strong financial incentive to reduce the utilization of unnecessary or
low-value treatments and to include relatively low-priced hospitals, physicians, and other health care
providers in their network.
A less comprehensive form of managed care used by many states during our study period is
primary care case management (PCCM). Under this model, a primary care provider is paid a fixed
amount per member per month to monitor and approve care for MMC enrollees (Rawlings-Sekunda
et al, 2001). In contrast to the HMO model, under PCCM the physician is not at financial risk for the
cost of their patients’ care and does not negotiate rates with health care providers. However, PCCM
providers may affect Medicaid expenditures through encouraging more efficient medical and
pharmaceutical utilization or through improving care in other ways. In this baseline year, just 3.2
percent of Medicaid recipients were in PCCM.
Table 2 sheds some light on the extent to which MMC enrollment varied across states in
1991. The median state had just 3.8 percent of its Medicaid recipients enrolled in an MMC plan in
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this baseline year, and more than one-third of states had none. Thus while MMC enrollment was high
in states such as Arizona, Colorado, and Utah, it was uncommon in most states. The reach of MMC
enrollment grew substantially during the next twelve years. As shown in the next column of Table 2,
most states enrolled at least two-thirds of their Medicaid recipients on MMC. By 2009, most enrolled
75 percent or more of their Medicaid recipients in MMC.
The growth in MMC enrollment summarized above coincided with a substantial increase in
the share of Medicaid spending accounted for by payments to MMC plans. As shown in Table 3, just
2.8 percent of Medicaid spending was paid to MMC plans in 1991. During the subsequent years, this
steadily increased, reaching 9.8 percent in 1997, 16.5 percent by 2003, and 21.5 percent by 2009.
During this same period, the share of Medicaid spending going directly to hospitals, physicians, and
long-term care facilities fell substantially, with these three accounting for 75.1 percent of Medicaid
spending in 1991 versus just 45.0 percent in 2009.
Given that 71.2 percent of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in MMC in 2009, it is to some
extent surprising that the payments to managed care plans accounted for just 21.5 percent of program
spending in this year. There are three primary explanations for this. First, the majority of MMC
enrollees were low-income women and children whose average spending is much lower than the
elderly and disabled.5 Second, many MMC enrollees are in primary care case management, which is
unlikely to produce any sharp increases in managed care payments. Third, some states ―carve out‖
certain services from their MMC contracts so that they would continue to reimburse, for example,
long-term care facilities on a fee-for-service basis.
And of course, another possible explanation is that states are able to reduce Medicaid
spending by shifting recipients from FFS into MMC, and thus MMC enrollees account for a smaller
share of spending than they would if they were in fee-for-service. Regardless of the explanation,
5

While accounting for just one-fourth of Medicaid recipients in 2009, the elderly and disabled accounted for 66
percent of Medicaid spending in that same year (KFF, 2012).
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235-05.pdf
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when considering the possible effect of MMC on Medicaid expenditures, it is important to keep in
mind that the plans accounted for just 21.5 percent of total program expenditures in the final year of
our study period.
Another important factor to consider in the analyses below is the variation across states with
respect to both the level and the growth rate of Medicaid spending per recipient during our study
period. Weighting each state equally, average Medicaid spending per recipient rose from $6,217 in
1991 to $8,084 in 2003 (in 2010 dollars).6 This represents an annual growth rate of 2.2 percent in real
Medicaid spending per recipient. Medicaid spending growth was lower over the next six years.
Average Medicaid spending per recipient was $8,215 in 2009, representing an annual growth rate of
just 0.3 percent. Of course, given Medicaid expansions, changes in economic conditions, and other
factors occurring during this period, the characteristics of Medicaid recipients are changing
substantially over time and thus this low growth may be largely explained by these compositional
changes.
There is substantial variation across states with respect to the level of spending in each year,
as shown in Table 4. For example, Medicaid spending per recipient in New York was twice as high
as average Medicaid spending in 1991 but fell by 0.5 percent per year during the next eighteen years.
In contrast, Medicaid spending in California was 49 percent lower than average Medicaid spending
in 1991 but grew by an average of 4.3 percent per year during the next eighteen years. Despite these
very different growth rates, Medicaid spending per recipient in New York was still 68 percent higher
than in California in 2009. These cross-state differences may partially reflect differences in the
characteristics of enrollees, which services are covered, the prices paid to health care providers, and
the average intensity of treatment.

6

The corresponding growth in Medicaid spending per recipient when weighting each state by its Medicaid
population in each year was a rise from $5,890 in 1991 to $7,848 in 2003 and $7,897 in 2009.
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While these cross-state differences in Medicaid spending per recipient are clearly of interest
in their own right7, in our empirical analyses below, we focus on within-state variation in Medicaid
spending by investigating whether it increases or declines following the shift to MMC.

3. Previous Literature
A large body of previous research has investigated the effect of HMOs and other managed
care organizations on the quality and cost of medical care among the privately insured. The evidence
on quality of care is mixed, with one influential survey article finding an approximately equal
number of studies suggesting improvements as reductions (Miller and Luft, 1997). Studies focusing
on cost have generally found that managed care lowers health care spending in the private sector.
These savings are often achieved primarily through reductions in provider prices rather than in
reductions in the utilization of medical care (Cutler et al, 2000; Dor et al, 2004). Previous evidence
also suggests that managed care was more successful in reducing costs during the 1990s than in more
recent years (Shen and Melnick, 2006).
Much previous work has also explored the effect of managed care in the Medicaid program,
where the growth in managed care enrollment was especially rapid during the 1990s. For a number of
reasons, one might expect the effect of managed care to be different for Medicaid recipients than for
the privately insured. First, Medicaid’s reimbursement rates for hospitals, physicians, and other
health care providers are on average much less generous than the rates negotiated by private health
insurers (Gruber, 2003; Garrett and Zuckerman, 2005). Thus there may be little room for these rates
to fall further and induce large reductions in spending. Second, Medicaid recipients ―churn‖ in and
out of the program more frequently than their counterparts with private insurance. To the extent that
managed care in the private sector achieves savings by, for example, encouraging preventive care up
7

A large literature has explored the variation across geographic areas in Medicare spending per recipient (Fisher et
al, 2003; Gottlieb et al, 2010). The variation shown in Table 4 for Medicaid is actually much greater than the
corresponding variation for Medicare.
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front to reduce hospitalizations in the future, the Medicaid program may not benefit from those
savings if the person is no longer enrolled. Third, the efficiency of care delivered by fee-for-service
Medicaid may differ from that in the private sector. If, for example, Medicaid recipients receive more
unnecessary services or care from costly sources such as emergency rooms than their counterparts in
the private sector, there may be room for even greater cost savings.
A recent Robert Wood Johnson Foundation synthesis report provides a thorough overview of
research on the effect of Medicaid managed care on access, quality, and expenditures (Sparer 2012).
Much of the literature focuses on access and quality; this is unsurprising because managed care is a
substantially different delivery system than fee for service. Managed care may improve access to
physicians – particularly primary care physicians – relative to FFS Medicaid through ensuring that all
MMC enrollees are connected to a primary care physician. Improved access to primary care may
subsequently reduce hospitalizations and ER visits. HMOs may also improve quality through care
coordination from a centralized entity. However, both PCCM and HMO programs may involve
gatekeeping, which could limit access to needed specialty care, particularly if Medicaid enrollees are
unable to overcome the hurdle of obtaining a referral. Likewise, the stricter network of physicians
within an HMO may provide an additional barrier to receiving care.
Research on the relationship between MMC and both access and quality provide mixed
results. Several studies have found that MMC – particularly HMO style programs – is associated
with greater likelihood of having a usual source of care (for example, Coughlin et al 2008 and Garrett
and Zuckerman 2005). However, Greene et al (2005) finds that MMC is not associated with an
increase in primary care provider participation and Baker and Afendulis (2005) find that children in
PCCM programs are less likely to have a usual source of care and also have more unmet needs.
Similarly, Aizer et al (2007) and Kaestner et al (2005) find that MMC is not associated with
improved prenatal care.
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MMC is not consistently associated with reduced preventable hospitalizations or
improvements in other measures of quality, either. Bindman, et al (2005) find that MMC reduces
ambulatory care-sensitive hospitalizations in California and Basu et al (2004) find slightly fewer
preventable hospitalizations among MCO enrollees in a few states. Baker and Afendulis (2005) find
that both PCCM and HMO programs increase outpatient use and HMOs are also associated with
reduced ER visits and hospitalizations. However, Aizer et al (2007) find increases in low-birth
weight and neonatal death in the same state. Howel et al (2004) and Duggan (2004) both find that
managed care is not significantly associated with any changes in birth weight or in health outcomes
in either direction.
Research on the effect of MMC on Medicaid spending is similarly mixed and sparse. One
especially relevant study from this prior literature used data from four rounds of the Community
Tracking Study (CTS) to estimate the effect of Medicaid managed care on various measures of health
care utilization (Herring and Adams, 2011). The authors take this analysis one step further by
exploring the effect of Medicaid managed care on expenditures, and found that HMO-style MMC did
not reduce costs. However, because the CTS data does not contain information on health care
spending, the authors needed to simulate it using data from another source (the Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey) that allows them to estimate the average impact of each type of utilization on total
spending. These estimated effects are then multiplied by the corresponding individual-specific
quantities for each type of service and aggregated by the person. As the authors note, they ―measure
the potential effect on state program expenditures,‖ which is certainly an important outcome variable.
But to the extent that MMC plans contract with different providers, negotiate different provider
reimbursement rates, or have different administrative costs than fee-for-service Medicaid, this
approach may provide a misleading estimate of the effect of MMC on actual Medicaid spending.
Relatively few studies have investigated the effect of MMC enrollment on actual Medicaid
expenditures. One study examined this issue in the state of California by exploiting variation across
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counties during the 1993 to 2001 period in the timing of mandates requiring certain categories of
Medicaid recipients to enroll in an HMO (Duggan, 2004). The results from this study demonstrated
that the policy-induced shift of Medicaid recipients into managed care resulted in a substantial
increase in Medicaid spending in the state of California. In contrast, a recent survey article prepared
for America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) found that MMC achieved cost savings in several
states during the 1990s (Lewin Group, 2009). Virtually all of the studies of Medicaid spending cited
in this survey article focused on just one state.8
No previous study has exploited the considerable variation across states with respect to
Medicaid managed care policy to estimate the effect of MMC on Medicaid expenditures. This is in
some respects surprising given the importance of the Medicaid program to both the federal budget
and to individual state budgets and given the increase in MMC enrollment since the early 1990s.
Indeed, there are now more than 35 million U.S. residents in some form of Medicaid managed care,
and this number is likely to grow substantially in the near future as a result of additional policy
changes requiring MMC enrollment and because of the PPACA-induced increase in Medicaid
enrollment that will begin in 2014.9

4. The Relationship between MMC Enrollment and Medicaid Spending
The typical motivation for shifting Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service into Medicaid
managed care is that it will lead to improved access and quality of care for Medicaid recipients while
simultaneously allowing states to reduce Medicaid spending. While several case studies of specific
states suggest the possibility of cost savings (Lewin Group, 2009), no systematic analysis of a large

8

The one exception to this among the articles cited in the survey is a study by Mathematica, which examines the
issue for 5 states over a 3 to 6 year period during the mid-1990s. Interestingly, the authors of this study ―concluded
that (MMC) had little effect on state expenditures.‖ This study, like virtually all of the other studies cited in this
Lewin Group report, was not published in a peer-reviewed journal.
9
CMS projects that more than one-fourth of U.S. residents will be insured by Medicaid in 2014 and that Medicaid
spending will exceed expenditures by the Medicare program in each year from 2016 through 2019 (CMS, 2010).
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sample of states has ever been conducted. The analysis in this section aims to fill this gap by using
CMS data on total annual Medicaid spending in each state from 1991 through and including 2009.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth considering the relative strengths and
weaknesses of using aggregate data to answer this question. Previous work on this same issue for
California’s Medicaid program used individual-level claims and enrollment data for a random 20
percent sample of the state’s Medicaid population during the 1993 to 2001 period (Duggan, 2004).
One advantage of this approach was that it allowed the author to use individual fixed effects for a
large sample of program participants and thus estimate whether spending for the same individual
increased or declined following a mandate-induced shift into MMC.10 However, one important
disadvantage was that it excluded certain categories of Medicaid spending such as administrative
costs, which are not included in claims data and might plausibly change following a shift to MMC.
Similarly, this previous study ignored the possibility of general equilibrium effects – namely that
shifting Medicaid recipients into MMC might affect how health care providers treated those
remaining in FFS. The aggregate state data utilized in the present study includes a more
comprehensive measure of Medicaid spending and would capture those general equilibrium effects.11
Turning now to our analyses of state-level Medicaid spending, our key explanatory variable
is the share of Medicaid recipients in MMC plans. We also estimate several specifications in which
we differentiate between HMO and PCCM enrollment. Our baseline specification is as follows:
(1) Log(McdSpendkt) = t + k +  * Log(McdRecipskt) +  * MMCkt +  * Xkt + t * k + kt
In this equation, the dependent variable is the log of Medicaid spending. We control for the log of the
number of Medicaid recipients to account for the fact that Medicaid spending will tend to be much
10

With a sample of more than one million Medicaid recipients, an additional benefit of the individual-level data was
that it yielded relatively precise estimates.
11
It is also worth noting that, in order to perform an analysis similar to the California one for the entire U.S., it
would be necessary to obtain Medicaid claims data for all fifty states, as CMS does not currently produce a random
sample for Medicaid as they do for Medicare. This no doubt also partially explains why many issues that have been
researched extensively for Medicare, such as variation across geographic areas in spending and treatment patterns,
have been virtually ignored for the Medicaid program.
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higher in states with high Medicaid enrollment like California than in low enrollment states like
North Dakota. We also control for the age distribution of Medicaid recipients (fraction ages 0-14 and
fraction age 65 and up), and for the fraction eligible because of blindness or a disability. Each
specification that we estimate includes a full set of state fixed effects and state-specific linear time
trends to control for differences in both the level and the growth rate of spending across states that
are unrelated to MMC enrollment. We also include a full set of year fixed effects to control for
changes in Medicaid spending that are common to all states.
In contrast to a specification that uses per-recipient Medicaid spending as the dependent
variable, this specification allows spending for the marginal recipient to differ from the average
recipient. If marginal recipients tend to be less expensive than the average, then the coefficient
estimate on 1 will be less than 1. As we discuss below, our results are qualitatively similar if we
instead use per-recipient Medicaid spending as our dependent variable.
The explanatory variable of interest is β1, which captures the relationship between MMC
enrollment and Medicaid spending after controlling for the variables described above. To the extent
that MMC enrollment leads to lower spending, one would expect a negative estimate from this
parameter. Of course, it is possible that changes in MMC enrollment are correlated with other
unobserved determinants of Medicaid spending, and thus β1 may not capture the average causal
effect of MMC enrollment. To address this concern, in the next section we estimate a companion set
of specifications using an instrumental variables strategy.
The first column of Table 5 summarizes the results from our baseline specification. Our point
estimate for 1 is 0.057 and this is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that a
10 percentage point increase in MMC enrollment is associated with a 0.6 percentage point increase in
Medicaid spending. This is to some extent surprising given that a primary motivation for shifting
Medicaid recipients into MMC plans is often to reduce spending. Our results strongly suggest that
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the opposite is true. The estimate for 1 is substantially less than 1 at 0.203, suggesting that the
marginal Medicaid recipient has lower spending than the average recipient. The significantly
negative estimate on the share under the age of 15 is as expected given that children are on average
much less expensive than other Medicaid recipients. The estimates for the coefficients on the share
elderly and the share blind or disabled are both positive, as expected, but are not statistically
significant.
In the next specification we split the % MMC variable into the share in PCCM plans and the
share in HMOs and other risk-based plans. The significantly positive point estimate for HMO plans
is almost three times as large as the insignificant estimate for PCCM plans (0.073 versus 0.025) and
these two estimates are significantly different from one another at the 10 percent level (p-value of
.065). It therefore appears that the increase in spending associated with the shift to MMC plans is
driven by HMOs and other risk-based plans.
One potential concern with this first set of estimates is that it includes all categories of
Medicaid spending. There are certain components of Medicaid spending that are very unlikely to be
affected by MMC contracting, such as long-term care and Disproportionate Share hospital payments.
Thus in the next three pairs of specifications we consider alternative measures of Medicaid spending
that exclude one or both of these components. In every case, the point estimate is larger than in our
baseline specification. For example when we exclude both categories of spending, the point estimate
for 1 on the % MMC variable increases from 0.057 to 0.101, with this latter estimate significant at
the five percent level. Had the estimates instead remained the same or declined, it might suggest that
we were picking up the effect of other shocks to Medicaid spending that were affecting all categories.
Instead, our results strongly suggest that the components of Medicaid spending most affected by
MMC grow more rapidly than the unaffected components when MMC enrollment grows.
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In the final pair of specifications, we focus on the 1991 through 2003 period given this is the
same time period during which we have information on MMC mandates, which serve as our
instrument in the next section. In general the point estimates are almost identical to the ones in our
baseline specification though because the standard errors increase somewhat they are no longer
statistically significant.
Our results are very similar if we explore the relationship of the fraction in MMC with
Medicaid spending per recipient.12 For example if we estimate a specification in which we use this as
our dependent variable (and thus no longer control for the log of the number of Medicaid recipients)
we obtain a point estimate of 373. Given average Medicaid spending per recipient of 6253 during our
study period, this is equivalent to a 6.0 percent increase, which is almost exactly the same as the
implied effect from the log of Medicaid spending specification.
One final concern with this first set of specifications is that it considers all Medicaid
recipients simultaneously. If one looks across Medicaid eligibility categories, it is clear that children
and non-elderly adults who are eligible due to low income (as opposed to because of a disability) are
much more likely to enroll in managed care.13 We therefore obtained data from an alternative source
within CMS on Medicaid spending by eligibility category for the 1999 (the first year available)
through 2009 period.14 Estimating an analogous specification to the one in the first column of Table
5, we obtain a point estimate of 0.047 for this group, which is very similar to the baseline point
estimate of 0.057. More importantly, our estimate for all other Medicaid recipients is slightly
negative (-0.044). This provides further support for our results above as it suggests that Medicaid

12

We also estimated specifications in which we explored the relationship of the explanatory variables described
above with the change in the log of Medicaid spending. Our results with this dependent variable were qualitatively
similar, suggesting that if anything the shift to MMC increased the growth rate of Medicaid spending.
13
As shown in Appendix Table 1, almost half (49.5 percent) of Medicaid spending for children and adults in 2009
went to MMC plans while the corresponding share for other Medicaid recipients was less than half that amount.
14
The Medicaid spending by eligibility category was obtained from the following website: http://msis.cms.hhs.gov.
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spending rose differentially for the eligibility categories most affected by MMC when the share in
MMC increased.
Taken together, the results in this section strongly suggest that the shift to MMC has on
average increased rather than reduced Medicaid spending. In the next section we probe further on
these results by instrumenting for the share in MMC using state and local MMC mandates.

5. The Effect of State and Local Mandates on MMC Enrollment
The OLS results described in the previous section suggest that Medicaid managed care
programs—in particular, HMO and other risk-based programs—increase state Medicaid
expenditures. However, certain populations make a choice to enroll in managed care, whether
because of county-based policies or because of their preferences for medical care.15 These choices to
enroll in managed care (or not) may introduce selection bias into our OLS results. This section
outlines our strategy for using the presence of a state or local MMC mandate as an instrumental
variable for Medicaid managed care enrollment. We begin by summarizing why an instrument is
useful in our application.

A. The Endogeneity of Voluntary MMC Enrollment
At the individual level, Medicaid spending varies substantially across individuals as a
function of observable factors such as age, basis of eligibility, and state of residence and
unobservable factors such as illness severity. Isolating the effect of MMC from these other factors is
difficult if individuals have the option to enroll in Medicaid managed care plans. For example,
health insurers may find it optimal to target marketing to Medicaid recipients with relatively low
costs, conditional on their observable characteristics, given that they are paid a fixed amount per
15

Through 1996, over half of people living in counties with any type of Medicaid HMO program were only exposed
to voluntary HMO programs. This share dropped rapidly beginning in the mid-1990s, but remained roughly 40% in
1997 and 25% in 1998.
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enrollee per month. Similarly, individuals with higher utilization may prefer to remain in traditional
fee-for-service Medicaid, where they may face fewer restrictions on the quantity of care that they
receive or may have long-standing relationships with certain health care providers. On the other
hand, these same recipients may have more to gain from better coordination of their medical care,
and thus may prefer to ―opt in‖ to voluntary managed care plans. Thus it is theoretically ambiguous
whether healthier (low-cost) Medicaid recipients would be more likely to ―opt in‖ to a voluntary
MMC program.16
Previous work on Medicaid managed care in the state of New York found that AFDC
recipients who voluntarily enrolled in MMC differed on both observable and unobservable
dimensions from those remaining in fee-for-service (Glied et al, 1997). For example, MMC enrollees
were much more likely to be in good or excellent health than those in traditional Medicaid. The
authors conclude that ―selection affects estimates of utilization savings between managed care and
fee-for-service‖ in Medicaid. More recent work for the Medicare program, which does not require
managed care enrollment, also indicates that healthier recipients are significantly more likely to join
managed care plans (Brown et al, 2011). To the extent that the individuals who voluntarily enroll in
MMC differ from their observably similar counterparts who remain in fee-for-service, a plausibly
exogenous source of variation in MMC enrollment can be used to estimate its effect on spending or
other outcome variables of interest.

B. State and Local MMC Mandates
Virtually every state now requires at least some of its Medicaid recipients to enroll in
managed care plans. These mandates typically vary by geography and/or by basis of Medicaid
eligibility. For example beginning in the spring of 1994, individuals who qualified for Medicaid
16

These same endogeneity concerns would exist at the state level as well. If, for example, a state’s Medicaid
recipients were becoming unobservably healthier (or sicker) over time because of changes in state outreach efforts,
eligibility rules, or economic conditions, one might find a mechanical change in the share in MMC.
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through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, now Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families) in California’s Sacramento County were required to enroll in a Medicaid managed care
plan. Elderly and disabled Medicaid recipients in Sacramento had the option to enroll but were not
required to do so. Previous work used county-level MMC mandates as a plausibly exogenous source
of variation to estimate the effect of MMC enrollment on Medicaid spending in the state of
California (Duggan, 2004).
The current study extends this approach by using data on MMC mandates and Medicaid
spending for all fifty states during the period when MMC enrollment experienced most of its growth.
The last two columns of Table 1 show how MMC mandates have expanded over time. In 1991, only
5.9 percent of the U.S. population resided in a county with an MMC mandate of any kind; only 3.0
percent resided in a county with a mandate to enroll in an HMO. 17 The remaining mandates either
required PCCM enrollment or required enrollment in either PCCM or an HMO plan. The difference
between the population residing in counties with mandates and actual MMC enrollment suggests that
much of the MMC enrollment in 1991 was in voluntary programs. By 2003, over three-quarters of
the U.S. population resided in a county with an MMC mandate, and two-fifths resided in a county
with a mandate to enroll in an HMO. Note that the mandate survey data is only available through
2001, and could only be extended through 2003. Thus, our primary IV specifications will only cover
the 1991-2003 time period.
As shown in Table 2, the vast majority of states had no MMC mandates in effect at the
beginning of our study period in 1991. This changed significantly during the next twelve years, so
that by 2003 all but six states required at least some of their Medicaid recipients to enroll in a
managed care plan. This pattern tracks closely to the actual MMC enrollment. For example, these six
states all had MMC enrollment below 15 percent in 2003, while none of the remaining 45 states
17

We obtained information on state and county-level MMC mandates in each year from Urban Institute county-level
surveys. These mandates are typically set at the state level, but often vary across counties (thus we refer to them as
―state and local mandates‖). See the Data Appendix for more details on the Urban Institute surveys.
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enrolled less than 28 percent of their Medicaid recipients in MMC. In 2003, we estimate that 77.9
percent of Medicaid recipients resided in a county with an MMC mandate, versus just 5.9 percent in
1991. From 1991 to 2003, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC plans increased from
10.6 percent to 58.4 percent.
Actual MMC enrollment is lower than the estimated share residing in a county with an MMC
mandate for at least three reasons. First, many categories of Medicaid recipients are not subject to the
mandates. The aged, blind, and disabled individuals who qualify for Medicaid through the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program are often excluded from MMC mandates. Second,
there is often a lag between new Medicaid eligibility and enrollment in an MMC plan. And finally,
some individuals who are subject to the mandate receive an exemption and thus remain in traditional
FFS.
The following specification describes our first stage specification of the relationship between
MMC mandates and MMC enrollment:
(2) MMCkt = t + k +  * Mandatekt +  * Xkt + t * k + kt
In this specification, k and t index states and years, respectively. MMCkt represents the fraction of
state k’s Medicaid recipients enrolled in managed care in year t, while Mandate kt equals our estimate
of the fraction of state k’s Medicaid recipients residing in a county with an MMC mandate.
Regarding this latter variable, we do not have county-level Medicaid enrollment for most of our
study period. Thus to estimate the share of a state’s Medicaid recipients residing in a county with an
MMC mandate, we weight each county by its share of the state population in each year.18 In this
specification, we also include some controls for the characteristics of each state’s Medicaid
recipients, such as the fraction who are under the age of 15 and the fraction who are elderly (65 and
older), in the vector Xkt. The specification also includes 13 year fixed effects (t) to control for
18

Our results, which we summarize below, are very similar if we instead weight by the county’s share of the state’s
low-income population or if we use the county population for just one specific year rather than allowing this
population to change over time. See the Data Appendix for more details on our variable construction.
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common changes throughout the U.S. in MMC enrollment. The vector k represents a full set of
state fixed effects, and these are also interacted with the year to construct a full set of state-specific
linear time trends. Compressing the rich variation in the county-level data to 50 states plus D.C. is
admittedly a limitation of this approach. However, an important benefit is that it allows us to estimate
the average effect in all 50 states and the District of Columbia simultaneously rather than estimating
the effect in just one state as in previous work.
The parameter of particular interest in equation (1) is , which captures the relationship
between the share of a state’s Medicaid recipients residing in counties with MMC mandates and the
fraction actually enrolled in MMC. The key assumption that is necessary to assign a causal
interpretation to  is that the MMC mandates are, after controlling for the characteristics of a state’s
Medicaid recipients, state fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends, orthogonal to other
unobserved determinants of MMC enrollment. If, for example, states tended to implement MMC
mandates in counties where they expected voluntary MMC enrollment to decline, this would lead to
a biased estimate of the average causal impact of the mandates.

C. The Effect of MMC Mandates on MMC Enrollment
Table 6 summarizes the results from several specifications similar to (1). The first (not
numbered) column in this table displays the mean and standard deviation of the included explanatory
variables. Over the course of the 13-year study period, just over half of the population in the average
state resided in counties with some kind of MMC mandate. Interestingly, nearly half of that
population was subject to an HMO policy, while the remainder was split between PCCM mandates
and mixed mandates—which required enrollment in either PCCM or an HMO plan.
The remaining (numbered) columns report the results from variations on the first stage
specification. The first three columns report results from specifications that include overall MMC
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enrollment share as the dependent variable and the share of state population residing in a county with
an MMC mandate as the primary explanatory variable. The first specification includes state and year
fixed effects only, the second specification adds demographic control variables, and the third
specification adds state-specific trends. Standard errors in this table and all subsequent ones are
clustered by state to account for the possibility of within-state interdependence in the residuals due to
serial correlation (Bertrand et al, 2004). In each specification,  is substantial and precisely
estimated, ranging from 0.465 in the most parsimonious specification to 0.374 in the least.
The final three specifications break the primary explanatory variable into its three
components: the share of the state population residing in a county with a PCCM mandate, mixed
mandate, or HMO mandate. The results listed in column (4) show that each of these three mandate
types were strongly predictive of overall MMC enrollment, with precisely estimated coefficients
ranging from 0.329 for the share residing in a PCCM mandate county to 0.418 for the share residing
in a mandatory HMO county. Columns (5)-(6) demonstrate the relationship between these
explanatory variables and enrollment in PCCM and HMO plans. Not surprisingly, the share residing
in a mandatory PCCM county has a strong predictive relationship with PCCM enrollment, and no
relationship with HMO enrollment (coefficients are 0.373 and -0.044, respectively). The converse is
true for the share of a state population residing in a mandatory HMO county (coefficients of -0.040
for the PCCM specification and 0.458 for the HMO specification). There is a substantial and
precisely estimated coefficient on the share residing in a mixed mandatory county in both columns,
suggesting that mixed mandatory policies are relevant for both PCCM and HMO enrollment.
Comparing the coefficient in column (5) of 0.263 to the coefficient in column (6) if 0.149 suggests
that residing in a mixed mandatory county is more strongly related to PCCM enrollment than HMO
enrollment. This comparison is unsurprising because Medicaid recipients in these counties are often
auto-enrolled in a PCCM plan if they do not choose their own plan.
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Taken together, the results in this section demonstrate that the MMC mandates implemented
by state and local governments during our study period led to significant increases in MMC
enrollment. From 1991 to 2003, the fraction of Medicaid recipients with a mandate in their county
increased from 5.9 percent to 77.9 percent. Multiplying the increase in this share by our estimate of
the average effect of the mandates on MMC enrollment in the third specification (0.374), we estimate
that the mandates induced a 26.9 percentage point increase in MMC enrollment. This represents
more than half of the actual increase of 47.8 percentage points during our study period.

6. The Effect of Mandate-Induced MMC Enrollment on Medicaid Expenditures
As shown in Table 3, the shift from fee-for-service to managed care within the Medicaid
program during our study period was associated with a significant shift in the composition of
Medicaid spending. In the eighteen years from 1991 to 2009, payments to managed care
organizations grew by an average of 18.1 percent per year (from $4.2 billion to $83.4 billion) versus
just 5.5 percent annually for all other Medicaid spending. As a result, payments to HMOs and other
MCOs rose from 2.8 percent of Medicaid spending in 1991 to 21.5 percent by 2009. As discussed
above, this 2009 expenditure share is substantially below the corresponding share of Medicaid
recipients enrolled in MMC because many of the payments for more expensive categories of
recipients and types of services, as well as those for services provided under PCCM programs, are
paid on a fee-for-service basis.
We begin our IV expenditure analyses by estimating the effect of mandate-induced MMC
enrollment on the share of Medicaid spending paid to MMC organizations versus directly to health
care providers. This sheds some light on the extent to which MMC could plausibly have affected
total Medicaid spending. To do this, we use the mandate variables described above as instrumental
variables for the share of a state’s Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC.
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The specifications

summarized in columns (3), (4), and (6) of Table 6 represent our ―first-stage‖ in the IV specifications
below.
The key assumption of this empirical approach is that, after controlling for state fixed effects,
state-specific linear time trends, and the other explanatory variables described above, the timing of
the MMC mandates is unrelated to unobserved factors that would influence the composition or level
of total Medicaid spending in a state. If, for example, states tend to shift their Medicaid recipients
into MMC plans in response to previous or expected future increases in Medicaid spending, our
estimates could be biased.
While it is not possible to rule out all possible sources of omitted variable bias, we test our
key identifying assumption in a number of ways. First, we explore whether the MMC mandates are
systematically related with total Medicaid enrollment.19 If state policymakers were responding to
projected enrollment-induced increases in program expenditures by shifting more of their
beneficiaries into MMC plans, one would expect to estimate a positive value for µ2 in the following
specification:
(3) Mandatekt = t + k +  * Log(Medicaid Recipientskt) + t * k + kt
Note that in this specification, the outcome variable is the fraction of Medicaid recipients with an
MMC mandate in their county while the key explanatory variable is (the log of) the number of
Medicaid recipients. Our estimate for  from this specification is small in magnitude (0.003) and
statistically insignificant (p-value of 0.988), thus providing little support for the hypothesis that state

19

We take the log of Medicaid enrollment given the very large differences across states in Medicaid enrollment. For
example in 2003, Medicaid enrollment in California was 6.27 million versus just 53.8 thousand in North Dakota.
Thus in specification (2), year effects control for common proportional changes in Medicaid enrollment, while statespecific linear trends allow for a constant growth rate in enrollment. For the same reasons in our analyses of total
Medicaid spending, we take the log of this variable.
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policymakers responded to Medicaid enrollment increases by shifting more of their recipients into
managed care plans.20
We next investigate whether the mandates are driven by past increases in Medicaid
expenditures by estimating specifications of the following type:
(4) Mandatekt = t + k +  * Log(Medicaid Spendingk,t-1) + t * k + kt
To the extent that state policymakers respond to increases in their Medicaid spending by shifting
more of their recipients into managed care plans in the future, one would expect to obtain a positive
estimate for . However, we once again obtain a small and statistically insignificant estimate (of
.028 with a p-value of 0.862), suggesting that the mandates are not being driven by accelerations in
state Medicaid spending.
Another potential concern is that state policymakers shifted Medicaid recipients into MMC
plans in response to past, current, or expected changes in economic conditions. To explore this
possibility, we also estimated specifications similar to (3) and (4), in which we replaced the
independent

variable

with

one

of

three

state-level

unemployment

variables:

lagged,

contemporaneous, and next year’s unemployment rate. In all three cases, the coefficient was
statistically insignificant, and the t-statistic never exceeded 0.50. These results suggest that mandate
implementation was not correlated with the business cycle. Further threats to validity may of course
still exist. For example, other changes in Medicaid programs that could affect Medicaid expenditures
may not be orthogonal to mandate implementation. For example, states may cut eligibility criteria (or
reduce outreach) while simultaneously shifting recipients to MMC plans. Likewise, Medicaid
recipients may migrate between mandate and non-mandate counties in response to mandate
implementation. These changes would likely change the composition of Medicaid recipients. Our

20

We also estimated specifications with the lag of this Medicaid enrollment measure, which essentially tests
whether current Medicaid enrollment is related with mandates in the next year. However, our estimates from this
specification are similarly small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
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controls for the age and eligibility categories of Medicaid recipients in our expenditure specifications
should go some way toward addressing this concern.

A. The Effect of Mandate-Induced MMC Enrollment on the Composition of Medicaid Spending
Table 7 summarizes the results from specifications that investigate the effect of the mandateinduced increases in MMC enrollment on the composition of Medicaid spending. This table provides
evidence that the switch to managed care caused a shift from providers to managed care plans,
validating the mandate and MMC enrollment variables. The first column summarizes the results from
this specification, in which the outcome variable is the share of a state’s Medicaid spending being
paid to hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers:
(5) ProviderSharekt = t + k +  * MMCkt +  * Xkt + t * k + kt
We instrument for MMCkt using the fraction with a mandate (see the first stage specification 3 from
Table 6). To the extent that MMC mandates cause a shift in Medicaid spending from health care
providers to managed care plans, one would expect a negative estimate for .21 Given that (1) MMC
enrollees tend to have lower costs on average than their counterparts who remain in fee-for-service
and (2) more than one-fourth of MMC enrollment is in primary care case management, one would
expect the magnitude of this estimate to be substantially less than one. Consistent with this, the
statistically significant estimate for  displayed in column (1) is -0.125. The second column includes
the share of Medicaid recipients enrolled in an HMO as an additional explanatory variable because,
unlike PCCMs, HMOs typically coordinate and finance most of the medical care for their enrollees.
As might be expected, there is a strong negative relationship ( equal to -0.382) between the share

21

To the extent that shifting from FFS to MMC increased overall spending, one would see a slightly larger increase
in the capitation share than if overall spending was unchanged. Suppose, for example, that a 10 dollar reduction in
FFS spending (caused by a shift to MMC) was associated with a 15 dollar increase in capitation spending. In that
case, the capitation share would increase somewhat more than if total spending was unchanged.
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of payments going directly to health care providers and Medicaid HMO enrollment. There is no
corresponding relationship for PCCM enrollment, which is consistent with the predictions above.
The next two columns of Table 6 reveal that the decline in provider share is almost perfectly
offset by an increase in the share of Medicaid spending going to managed care plans. The share of
Medicaid spending going to other sources, such as administrative costs or Medicare premiums (for
Medicaid recipients dually eligible for Medicare), is not significantly related with the mandateinduced increases in MMC enrollment, as shown in columns 5 and 6.
If one assumes that Medicaid HMOs finance all of the medical care for their enrollees (and
thus there is no fee-for-service spending on their behalf), then the estimate of -0.382 suggests that
HMO enrollees are much less expensive than the average Medicaid recipient. Suppose, for example,
that half of the Medicaid recipients in a state are shifted into Medicaid HMOs. The statistically
significant point estimates of -0.382 in column 2 and of 0.388 in column 4 suggest that
approximately 20 percent of Medicaid spending would be shifted from providers to insurers. In this
example, the other half of recipients remaining in fee-for-service would account for 80 percent of
spending, and thus the Medicaid HMO enrollees would on average be just one-fourth as expensive.
This is plausible given that the elderly and disabled, for whom per-recipient Medicaid spending is
several times more expensive, typically remained in FFS.
Appendix Table 2 further demonstrations the negative relationship between provider
payments and enrollment in managed care—in particular, enrollment in HMOs. Most notably, the
negative relationship is strongest for hospital and physician payments. The relationship is weaker for
prescription drugs, which is unsurprising because many managed care programs carve out
prescription drugs to take advantage of statutory Medicaid pharmaceutical rebates. There is no
relationship for long-term care providers, likely both because long term care is often carved out of
managed care programs and because the aged and disabled are less likely to be enrolled in managed
care. Thus, these specifications serve as a useful ―falsification test‖ for our identification strategy.
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Taken together, the results in this subsection reveal that the policy-induced shift of Medicaid
recipients from fee-for-service into Medicaid managed care has resulted in a shift of program
expenditures from providers to insurers. Of course, many of these same providers ultimately receive
the payments disbursed to health insurers. Interestingly, this shift in the composition of Medicaid
spending is only present for Medicaid HMOs. Furthermore, and as expected, revenues for certain
categories of providers, such as long-term care facilities, have been relatively unaffected by Medicaid
managed care. The next subsection explores whether the mandate-induced shift from fee-for-service
to MMC has affected total Medicaid spending.

B. The Effect of Mandate-Induced MMC Enrollment on Total Medicaid Spending
To investigate the effect of the mandate-induced increases in MMC enrollment on Medicaid
spending, we begin by estimating specifications of the following type:
(6) Log(McdSpendkt) = t + k +  * Log(McdRecipskt) +  * MMCkt +  * Xkt + t * k + kt
In this regression, the outcome variable is the log of Medicaid spending in state k and in year t. We
control for the same explanatory variables described above 22 and also for the log of the number of
Medicaid recipients. State fixed effects control for time invariant differences across states in the level
of Medicaid spending, while state-specific linear time trends control for differences across states in
the average growth rate of Medicaid spending.
Table 8 summarizes the results from this set of analyses. The first specification summarized
in column (1) is a reduced form estimate of the fraction of Medicaid recipients residing in a county
with an MMC mandate. The point estimate of -0.005 for  is small in magnitude and is statistically
insignificant with a standard error of 0.025. This suggests that the average effect of the MMC
mandates on Medicaid expenditures was close to zero.
22

One concern with this specification is that the mandates may affect the characteristics of Medicaid recipients, and
thus controlling for age and the basis of eligibility could bias our estimate for the effect of MMC mandates.
However, our estimate for this effect is almost identical if we do not control for these characteristics.
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The IV estimate for the spending effect of the fraction enrolled in MMC is summarized in the
next column. As one would expect given the first-stage estimates described above, at -0.014 the
magnitude of this IV estimate is higher than the reduced form estimate. However, it is also less
precisely estimated with a standard error of 0.060, and thus our 95 percent confidence interval
includes effects ranging from approximately a 13 percent reduction in Medicaid spending to a 10
percent increase. We can therefore rule out large effects of MMC contracting on Medicaid spending
in the average state, and thus our results provide little support for the hypothesis that the shift to
Medicaid managed care substantially reduced the strain on the typical state budget.23
The next two columns summarize the analogous reduced form and IV estimates that
differentiate between Medicaid HMO enrollment and other forms of Medicaid managed care. All of
the estimates in these columns are statistically insignificant, though the signs are interesting. For
example, the point estimates in the IV specification in column 4 suggest that PCCM may lead to a
modest reduction in Medicaid spending while the opposite is true for Medicaid HMO enrollment.24 It
is not implausible that PCCM could lower Medicaid spending, as primary care physicians may be
able to help Medicaid recipients increase the efficiency of their care by, for example, encouraging
adherence to pharmaceutical protocols and steering them to certain providers, despite not being at
financial risk. However, it is important to emphasize that these estimated effects are only suggestive
as neither coefficient is statistically significant.
The IV results are largely consistent with the OLS specifications from Table 5, particularly
those that cover the same time period. These results provide little evidence that MMC reduced state
spending on Medicaid, and they provide suggestive evidence that Medicaid HMOs increased
Medicaid spending by more than PCCM plans.
23

We performed additional specification checks by, for example, excluding long-term care expenditures from our
spending measure given that few states contracted with MMC organizations to coordinate long-term care services.
Our key estimates for the effect of MMC mandates on Medicaid spending are very similar.
24
The corresponding point estimates if we include variables for the percent in PCCM and HMO separately (rather
than an MMC main effect and the fraction in HMOs) are -0.060 and 0.048, respectively.
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C. Differential Effects by Relative Provider Reimbursement Rates
As discussed above, one possible source of heterogeneity in the effect of MMC contracting is
the generosity of Medicaid provider reimbursement relative to reimbursement by commercial
insurers. If, for example, Medicaid pays providers much lower rates than private insurers, then it may
simply not be possible for these insurers to lower Medicaid spending (even if they reduce utilization
to some degree). If, on the other hand, Medicaid’s reimbursement is close to that by private insurers,
then there may be some scope to reduce Medicaid spending through reductions in utilization of care.
To test this hypothesis, we next augment these specifications by interacting the MMC
mandate variable with an index for the generosity of a state’s Medicaid reimbursement (MC_Index)
relative to private insurers. This data was constructed using state Medicaid reimbursement rates in
1989, two years prior to the start of our study period, and represents the average ratio of Medicaid to
commercial reimbursement for a newborn delivery, which is the most common type of inpatient
admission among Medicaid recipients.25 The mean value of MC_Index is 0.56, implying that
Medicaid was 44 percent less generous than commercial reimbursement in the average state. This
measure does not vary within a state over time in our analyses and we de-mean it in all
specifications.
There is substantial heterogeneity across states with respect to this index of relative state
Medicaid reimbursement, with the ninetieth percentile state at 0.88 and the tenth percentile state at
just 0.36. Two states have a value of exactly 1.00, implying that Medicaid is as generous as
commercial insurers there, and no states are above this level. Thus according to this measure,
25

See Schwartz et al (1991) for a detailed description of this data. Our specifications assume that the index captures
the relative generosity of reimbursement for all health care providers, though it uses just newborn deliveries to
estimate this. However, research by Duggan (2000) suggests that newborns account for the majority of all Medicaidinsured hospital discharges, and this would likely be especially true for the MMC population. It is also worth noting
that neither Arizona nor Wyoming were included in this survey. Also, this data is for just one year and is not
updated over time. While national analyses of Medicaid reimbursement generosity have been conducted since this
study appeared, virtually no studies aim to measure this on a state-by-state basis relative to commercial insurance.
We therefore use this relatively old data, which was constructed just prior to the start of our study period.
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Medicaid was not more generous than commercial health insurance in any state around the beginning
of our study period.
The results displayed in the fifth column of Table 8 strongly suggest that the generosity of a
state’s Medicaid reimbursement, relative to private insurers, is a significant determinant of the
spending effects of MMC contracting.26 More specifically, the statistically significant estimate of 0.251 for the interaction between the mandate variable and MC_Index indicates that MMC lowered
spending by significantly more in states with generous provider reimbursement. This suggests that, if
Medicaid provider rates are particularly low, then Medicaid managed care is unlikely to reduce
spending. The estimate of -0.251 suggests that changing the index by one standard deviation (0.19) is
associated with a 4.8 percentage point change in the reduced-form effect of the mandate. Given that
MC_Index is demeaned, the point estimate of -.012 for the main mandate variable suggests that the
effect of MMC contracting for a state with average Medicaid reimbursement generosity is very small.
In the next specification, we investigate whether this effect is specific to HMOs by
interacting the Medicaid reimbursement index with both the main mandate variable and the HMO
mandate variable. Theoretically, one might expect the difference to be present only for HMOs, as
state governments continue to directly reimburse health care providers under PCCM. On the other
hand, a state with relatively generous Medicaid reimbursement may experience more overutilization
under a fee-for-service system. Thus there may be more scope for primary care case managers to
reduce utilization through better care coordination in such a state. It is therefore theoretically
ambiguous whether the spending effect of generous Medicaid reimbursement would be restricted to
HMOs or would also be present in states that used PCCM.

26

To investigate whether states with higher Medicaid provider reimbursement rates were more (or less) likely to
shift Medicaid recipients into MMC plans, we regressed the twelve-year change in the state-level MMC mandate on
this index. The point estimate was negative (suggesting that states with more generous provider reimbursement were
less likely to shift recipients into MMC) though statistically insignificant with a t-statistic of -1.22.
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The results summarized in the sixth column of Table 8 suggest that the effect of Medicaid
provider reimbursement generosity is not significantly different for HMOs. More specifically, the
estimate for the interaction between the MC_index and the HMO mandate variable is small in
magnitude (0.039) and statistically insignificant, while the point estimate for the coefficient on the
interaction of this index with the main mandate variable is unchanged and remains statistically
significant. This suggests that states that employ either HMO or PCCM contracting can achieve cost
savings if a state has relatively high provider reimbursement.
In the next specification, we introduce an alternative estimate of Medicaid reimbursement
generosity, which is the ratio of it to Medicare reimbursement.27 This specification serves as a useful
―falsification test‖ for whether the preceding estimates are actually picking up the effect of the
relative reimbursement generosity of Medicaid versus private insurers. More specifically, the
relationship between Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rates has no bearing on whether HMOs
can reduce Medicaid spending by taking advantage of low provider reimbursement rates in the
private sector. The estimate for the interaction of this variable, which we label MM_Index, with the
main mandate variable is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. The next specification
includes interactions with both MC_Index and MM_Index, and the coefficients on the interaction
terms are consistent with the previous specifications. These findings suggest that the generosity of
Medicaid reimbursement relative to commercial insurers is the key source of heterogeneity. This is as
one would expect, as the relevant difference for the typical Medicaid managed care organization is
Medicaid reimbursement versus private health insurance, not relative to Medicare.
Taken together, the results in this subsection suggest that, on average, MMC contracting did
not lead to substantially lower (or higher) Medicaid spending during the 1991 through 2003 period.
However, our findings do suggest that in states with relatively generous Medicaid reimbursement,
27

Our primary source for this ratio is Norton and Zuckerman (2002) and these ratios are for 1998. However, the data
are missing for several states in this survey, and thus we supplement it with data from Zuckerman et al (2009) for
2008. We scale down these later values to account for the increase in the average ratio from 1998 to 2008.
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contracting did achieve cost savings, while the opposite was true in states with less generous provider
reimbursement. These findings underscore the importance of considering a state’s unique
circumstances when considering the potential savings from shifting Medicaid recipients from fee-forservice into managed care plans.

7. Discussion
From 1991 to 2009, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in HMOs and other managed
care plans increased from 11 percent to 71 percent. These increases were largely driven by state and
local mandates that required Medicaid recipients to enroll in a managed care plan. Using panel data
for all 50 states and the District of Columbia over a thirteen-year period, the results in this paper
suggest that shifting Medicaid recipients into managed care plans did not reduce Medicaid spending
in the typical state. In fact, the OLS results for the extended 19-year period suggest that MMC
increased Medicaid spending, particularly when states contracted out to HMO plans.
However, in states with relatively generous provider reimbursement rates, our results suggest
that MMC contracting did reduce Medicaid spending below what it otherwise would have been. Our
findings suggest that the opposite was true in states with low provider reimbursement rates at the
start of our study period. The differential results for states with higher versus lower Medicaid
provider rates relative to commercial rates did not distinguish between HMO and PCCM types of
MMC. However, it is worth noting that residents of states with below-average FFS reimbursement
rates (relative to commercial) are more than twice as likely to reside in a county with an HMO-only
mandate (53.3 percent versus 24.7 percent). In conjunction with the final set of results, this
observation may explain the OLS and IV findings that HMOs are more likely to increase state
Medicaid expenditures.
To the extent that MMC may have increased state Medicaid expenditures on average, these
increases may have been worthwhile in exchange for improved access to care or improved quality of
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care. However, the mixed results of the quality/access literature cited above suggests that additional
spending did not provide states with improved health care for their Medicaid recipients.
The fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC plans has increased only gradually
during the last several years, growing from 71 percent in 2009 to 74 percent by 2011.28 However,
recent survey evidence suggests that a large number of states are planning to expand the reach of
their MMC programs in the near future. This shift is likely to focus relatively more on elderly and
disabled Medicaid recipients, who were largely exempted from the MMC mandates during the 1990s
and early 2000s. While representing just one-fourth of Medicaid recipients, this group accounts for
approximately two-thirds of Medicaid spending. Thus the share of Medicaid spending paid to
managed care plans may increase by substantially more than the share of Medicaid recipients in
MMC plans in the near future. Of course, because aged and disabled Medicaid recipients differ in
many respects from most of the Medicaid recipients directly affected by previous MMC mandates,
our findings would not necessarily translate to this group.
Projections from the Congressional Budget Office suggest that the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act will increase the number of Medicaid recipients by approximately 9 million by
2015 (CBO 2012). This growth may be even larger if states currently expected not to proceed with
their Medicaid expansion, such as Florida and Texas, do move forward with the expansion. It is
plausible that the vast majority of those newly eligible for Medicaid, which will include individuals
without health insurance with family incomes below 138 percent of the poverty line, will enroll in
MMC plans.29

28

As is apparent in Table 1, the slowdown in MMC enrollment generally and Medicaid HMO enrollment
specifically started around 2000. This coincides with the timing of the beginning of a gradual decline in HMO
enrollment among the privately insured (Cooper, Simon, and Vistnes, 2006).
29
PPACA extended Medicaid to non-elderly U.S. residents with incomes at or below 133 percent of the federal
poverty line (FPL). A provision of the subsequent Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 effectively
changed that to 138 percent of FPL.
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For all of these reasons, the reach of Medicaid managed care is likely to expand significantly
in the years ahead. How states can achieve greater success in their MMC programs with respect to
improved quality and lower Medicaid spending represents an important area for future research. For
this it would be especially fruitful to obtain individual-level longitudinal data on MMC enrollment
and Medicaid spending for a large number of states over a long time period, which would allow one
to telescope in on specific geographic areas or on particular subpopulations within these states.
Additionally, more research regarding the effect of Medicaid managed care on both the utilization
and the price of health care services could shed light on the mechanisms through which MMC can
affect program expenditures and the health outcomes of Medicaid recipients.
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Data Appendix
This study utilized data on Medicaid expenditures, enrollment in Medicaid and in Medicaid managed
care programs, and Medicaid demographic information from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) and mandate data from the Urban Institute.
Expenditure Data
Medicaid expenditure data comes from the CMS-64 Reports (available here for 1997-2009:
https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidBudgetExpendSystem/02_CMS64.asp), which contain state-level
expenditures for relatively narrow service categories for each year. These service categories were
aggregated into broader categories as follows:
Hospital spending: inpatient and outpatient hospital spending, including disproportionate share
payments
Physician: physician services, clinic services, labs and radiology, and other practitioners
Long-term care: hospice, intermediate care facilities, and nursing care facilities
Prescription drugs: prescription drug payments, net of manufacturer rebates
Home Health: home and community based services and home health services
Other providers: all other provider services, such as federally-qualified health centers and family
planning services – excluding dental services or emergency services for undocumented immigrants
Managed care: payments to physicians for primary care case management programs; capitated
payments to managed care organizations, prepaid health plans, all-inclusive elderly plans; and other
Medicaid health insurance payments
Other expenditures: all other services such as administrative costs and premium and coinsurance
payments on behalf of enrollees who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid
Total expenditures include the sum total of all Medicaid expenditures, with the exception of dental
expenditures and emergency services for undocumented immigrants; SCHIP expenditures are
included in all of the above categories as applicable once the program began in 1998.
Medicaid Enrollment and Demographic Data
Both overall Medicaid and Medicaid managed care enrollment data as of June 30 come from the
Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment Reports for the years 1991-2009 (The 2009 report is available
here: http://www.cms.gov/medicaiddatasourcesgeninfo/04_mdmancrenrllrep.asp). Overall MMC
enrollment comes from the unduplicated total managed care enrollment figure. Before 1996, the
unduplicated total was not reported, so it was constructed from summed enrollment in individual
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managed care plans, excluding prepaid health plans for carved out services such as diabetes,
substance abuse, and mental health because these often enroll individuals who are also enrolled in
comprehensive medical plans. Dental managed care plans are excluded because these are inherently
different from those offering medical services.
Before 1996, the MMC Enrollment Reports did not report June 30 Medicaid enrollment. In order to
construct MMC penetration rates with a consistent base for each state, we estimated June 30
Medicaid enrollment for 1991-1995 using fiscal year Medicaid enrollment and the state-specific ratio
between June 30 enrollment and fiscal year enrollment for 1996. Fiscal year Medicaid enrollment
came from Medicaid Statistical Information Statistics reports (described here:
http://www.cms.gov/msis/). For the handful of cases where constructed unduplicated managed care
enrollment exceeded constructed Medicaid enrollment, the percent of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled
in managed care was capped at 100 percent.
Medicaid demographic information on age and eligibility through blindness or disability status also
came from the MSIS data reports. In the early-1990s, these reports were filled out & entered into
CMS systems by hand, and in a two cases there were clear instances of data entry being swapped
between columns. These instances are the following:
-

Arkansas: age 85+ and age unknown were swapped for 1991 and 1992
Connecticut: Eligibility through Blind/Disabled, Adults in FDC, and Title XIX were swapped
in 1991

Mandatory Managed Care Enrollment Policies
The Urban Institute conducted surveys in 1998 and 2001 to determine what types of MMC policies
existed for the welfare population in different geographic areas and years. Their surveys
differentiated between primary care case management programs and comprehensive managed care
organization programs and between voluntary and mandatory programs of both types. Survey data
was cross-checked with other sources, such as the CMS MMC enrollment reports and case studies
where possible. The resulting data set reports the existence of these managed care policies using
binary variables for each county-year observation. The 1998 survey is described further in Garrett, et
al 2003, which uses survey data from 1991-1995 in conjunction with National Health Interview
Survey data from the same time period to study the effect of MMC mandates on access and
utilization.
State-level mandate variables were constructed by combining these indicator variables with countylevel population data. For example, if a state had two counties – one with 70 people and a mandatory
managed care policy, and the other with 30 people and no managed care policy – the state-level
variable, percent mandatory, would equal 70 percent because 70 percent of the state’s population
lives in a county with a mandatory managed care policy.
In order to capture additional years of data beyond the MMC expansions in the 1990s, the Medicaid
mandate variables were extended to 2003. There were few changes in MMC mandates between 1999
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and 2001, and the plan-level MMC enrollment report tables for 2002 and 2003 were used to identify
which states expanded or contracted the geographic reach of their MMC policies. For example,
Kentucky’s mandatory PCCM program began operating statewide in 2002 and Mississippi dropped
its mandatory PCCM program in 2002. Our empirical results are very similar if we restrict attention
to the 1991 to 2001 period.
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